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Despite the long US history of taxing estates, 
the economic consequences of estate taxation 
in practice remain unclear. The US estate tax 
first appeared in 1797, only to be repealed in 
1802. Estate taxes were subsequently imposed 
on a temporary basis from 1862–1872 and 
1898–1902 to finance wartime expenditures. 
The modern estate tax was introduced in 1916, 
and, with varying exemption levels and tax rates, 
including a hiatus during 2010, has remained 
in force ever since. Taxes generally have been 
imposed only on large estates, the current $5.25 
million exempt amount implying that smaller 
estates escape federal taxes altogether.
The estate tax serves two functions: it col-
lects revenue from large estates, and it discour-
ages the transmission of wealth at death. It is 
an understatement to say that the US estate tax 
is controversial (for more of an explicit state-
ment and historical elaboration see Graetz and 
Shapiro 2005), as there is controversy over both 
the desirability of imposing estate tax burdens 
and the economic consequences of incentives 
created by estate taxation. One of the sources 
of differences in views over the likely effects of 
estate taxation is differing degrees of rational-
ity and foresight that are attributed to economic 
actors.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze incen-
tives created by estate taxes in a setting in which 
agents act rationally and are endowed with 
accurate foresight. Since estate taxes reduce 
resources available to individuals, and also 
affect relative prices, the taxes have income and 
substitution effects on labor supply, consump-
tion, saving, and other economic decisions. The 
paper considers the net impact of these effects 
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on labor supply, which has been the focus 
of much of the empirical estate tax literature 
(e.g., Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1993; 
Joulfaian and Wilhelm 1994; and Brown, Coile, 
and Weisbenner 2010), and which affords an 
opportunity to identify the income and substi-
tution considerations that affect other economic 
variables such as consumption and saving. The 
analysis does not presume that actual estate 
taxes are optimal, and indeed, the realities of the 
political process that determines estate tax rates 
and exemption levels makes many observers 
question whether the practice of US estate taxa-
tion bears much relationship to optimal taxation.
An important consideration in evaluating 
income and substitution effects is whether or 
not bequests are purposeful. Wealthy individu-
als can spend their money or give it away to 
others, including gifts in the form of bequests 
that require retaining assets until death. Rational 
individuals are of course aware of their own 
mortality, but may nevertheless make accidental 
bequests if they die unexpectedly and in pos-
session of bequeathable assets that had been 
intended for other purposes. There is a sizable 
literature (e.g., Kopczuk 2003; Kopczuk and 
Lupton 2007) that considers the determinants 
of bequests and the implications of accidental 
bequests for optimal estate taxation. This paper 
instead evaluates the effects of estate taxation, 
whether optimal or not, in a setting in which 
individuals can reasonably anticipate, and 
plan for, their own deaths. Such planning may 
include annuitizing a considerable portion of 
lifetime resources and setting aside the remain-
der for bequests (Sheshinski 2008).
A second important consideration is whether 
bequests are gratuitous. The alternative is that 
bequests are a form of payment (Bernheim, 
Shleifer, and Summers 1985), say for services 
rendered by subsequent legatees (those to whom 
bequests are directed). Bequests that are forms 
of payment do not contribute to the well-being 
of legatees to the same extent as do gratuitous 
bequests, since in the latter case legatees need 
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not offer something in return. The model follows 
much of the literature in assuming that bequests 
are gratuitous, returning in the conclusion to 
some of its implications.
If bequests are purposeful and gratuitous then 
estate taxes have two separate income effects on 
labor supply. The first is that estate taxes affect 
the magnitudes of after-tax receipts, both by 
reducing the amount of any pretax estate ulti-
mately received by legatees, and by possibly 
affecting pretax bequests. The second income 
effect arises because estate taxes reduce the well-
being of those who plan to make bequests. Estate 
taxes raise the cost of transmitting resources to 
legatees, and thereby reduce the real net worth 
of those with property intended for transmission 
at death. The combination of these two income 
effects reflects that if bequests are gratuitous and 
intentional, then their taxation imposes burdens 
not only on those who receive but also on those 
who give—including, commonly, the same indi-
viduals, who receive at one stage of life and give 
at another.
In addition to their income effects, estate 
taxes have substitution effects on labor supply. 
Estate taxes increase the cost of bequeathing 
after-tax resources relative to the costs of leisure 
and present consumption. If leisure and bequests 
are substitutes, which is likely, then the substitu-
tion effect of higher estate taxes is to discour-
age labor supply. Since the two income effects 
will generally encourage labor supply, whereas 
the substitution effect generally discourages it, 
the net impact of estate taxes on labor supply 
depends on relative magnitudes. Empirical labor 
supply elasticity estimates suggest that, despite 
two income effects pushing in the direction of 
making higher estate taxes encourage labor 
supply, the effect of the estate tax on aggregate 
labor supply is of uncertain sign.
I. Decomposing Income and Substitution
In a model in which individuals live for 
one period, individual utility can be expressed 
as a function of exogenous income, govern-
ment resources, and relative prices. Utility can 
be written in indirect form as V(y, g, w, p), in 
which y is exogenous resources, g is government 
tax revenue, w is the after-tax wage, and p is the 
price of bequeathing an additional after-tax dol-
lar to legatees. The price of current consump-
tion is normalized to unity. The assumption that 
 individuals choose their bequests requires the 
inclusion of the price of bequests as an argument 
of the utility function. Exogenous resources 
include any after-tax bequests received from 
others.
For convenience the estate tax is taken to be 
a linear function of bequests above an exempt 
amount, and the analysis considers only bequests 
above this amount. If bequests are subject to tax 
at rate t, then the price of after-tax bequests for 
a taxable estate is 1/(1 − t). Letting B denote 
pre-tax bequests that an individual chooses 
to leave, and E the exempt amount, it follows 
that B(1 − t) + Et is after-tax bequests, and the 
government collects tax revenue of (B − E)t 
from an individual’s bequests. Taking the same 
tax parameters to apply to receipts, and using 
an asterisk to denote receipts, an individual 
receives B*(1 − t) + Et in after-tax bequests 
from the previous generation.
An individual’s labor supply is likewise a 
function of exogenous income, government rev-
enue, and prices, and therefore can be denoted 
L(y, g, w, p). The effect of a permanent change 
in the tax rate has an obvious decomposition as
(1)  dL _
dt



















In evaluating (1), dp/dt = 1/(1 − t)2, and 
the effect of the tax change on tax rev-
enue (if labor income is untaxed) is dg/dt 
= tdB*/dt + B* − E. The effect of the tax 
change on exogenous after-tax bequest receipt 
is dy/dt = (1 − t)dB*/dt − B* + E. Further-
more, the derivative of labor supply with 
respect to the price change can be decomposed 
into a substitution effect and an income effect: 
 ∂L _∂p  =  
∂L _∂p  
c
 −  ∂L _∂y  ( B − E ) ( 1 − t ) , in which  
∂L _∂p  
c
 
is the compensated effect of a price change on 
labor supply.
If government tax revenue enters the util-
ity function in an additively separable fashion, 
then  ∂L _∂g  = 0, and (1) implies




  1 _ 
 ( 1 − t ) 2 
 
+  ∂L _
∂y
 [  ( 1 − t ) d B *  _dt  −  ( B * − E ) −   ( B − E )  _ ( 1 − t )   ] ⋅
The first term on the right side of equation (2) 
is the substitution effect of estate taxation on 
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labor supply, whereas the second term is the 
income effect. The substitution effect is rather 
straightforward, but the income term reflects the 
two components of income that are affected by 
estate tax changes, and that arise because indi-
viduals receive as well as leave estates.
The terms including variables with asterisks 
on the right side of (2) reflect the effect of a 
tax change on the after-tax portion of bequests 
that is taxable; their sum equals the value of the 
derivative d [( B * − E)(1 − t)]/dt. If this deriva-
tive equals zero, then estate tax changes slightly 
increase net receipts of legatees (by increas-
ing the value of the exempt amount), as pretax 
bequests increase in response to the tax changes. 
Since such an outcome would require life-
time consumption of those who leave bequests 
to fall dramatically in response to estate tax 
changes, it is much more likely that the deriva-
tive is negative; for example, if bequest behav-
ior is unresponsive to tax changes, d[ ( B * − E ) 
(1 − t)]/dt = − ( B * − E ) .
In order to consolidate terms it is helpful to 
consider a steady state in which bequests are 
unchanging across generations. Since such a 
steady state has the property that B = B*, it is 
then possible to define an elasticity of after-tax 
portion of taxable bequests with respect to one 
minus the tax rate. Denoting ε ≡  [ 1/ ( B − E ) ] 
× d[ ( B − E ) (1 − t)]/d ( 1 − t ) , it follows that 
(2) can be rewritten as




 1 _ 
 ( 1 − t ) 2 
 
 −  ∂L _
∂y
  
 ( B − E ) 
 _
 ( 1 − t ) 
   ( 1 + ε ) . 
The decomposition in equation (3) has the look 
of a standard separation of substitution effects 
of price changes, but for the (1 + ε) term on 
the right side. If individuals make bequests but 
do not receive them, then ε = 0. If individuals 
receive bequests, and pretax bequests are for 
some reason unaffected by estate taxation, then 
ε = 1, thereby doubling the income effect com-
pared to a setting in which there is a tax-induced 
price change without gratuitous transfers. More 
generally, the presence of the elasticity term on 
the right side of equation (3) picks up the sec-
ond income effect of estate tax changes on labor 
supply.
II. Empirical Implications
In order to evaluate the likely effects of estate 
taxation on labor supply it is helpful to recast 
equation (3) in a manner that expresses empiri-
cal magnitudes as commonly estimated elas-
ticities. Denoting the Marshallian own-price 
labor supply elasticity as M ≡  ∂L _ ∂w  
w _ L , and the 
Hicksian own-price labor supply elasticity as 
H ≡  ∂L _ ∂w
c
 w _ L , it follows from the Slutsky equation 
that  ∂L _∂y  =  
 ( M − H ) 
 _w  . Properties of compensated 
demands guarantee that H > 0, and while the 
sign of M depends on the relative importance of 
substitution and income effects, it is common to 
assume (though by no means universal to esti-
mate) that M > 0.
The magnitude of the substitution effect 
depends on the extent to which leisure and 
bequests are Hicksian substitutes or comple-
ments. Both are possibilities, since a third good, 
present consumption, also affects utility. Much of 
the literature makes the simplifying assumption 
that utility is weakly separable in leisure and in a 
composite of present consumption and after-tax 
bequests, which carries the implication that both 
bequests and present consumption are Hicksian 
substitutes for leisure. This weak separability 
assumption also implies that the substitution 
effect of estate taxes on labor supply stem solely 
from the fact that higher estate taxes increase the 
cost of the consumption bundle purchased with 
greater labor effort. Specifically, the separability 
assumption implies that  ∂L _∂p  
c
 = −  ∂L _ ∂w
c
 
B ( 1 − t ) 
 _L  . 
Applying the Hicksian definition, it follows 
that  ∂L _∂p  
c
 = − H  B ( 1 − t )  _w  .
A final notational convenience is to define 
α ≡ E/B as the ratio of the estate tax exemp-
tion to the size of the equilibrium pretax estate. 
Together, these simplifications imply that equa-




  =  −B _ 
 ( 1 − t ) 
 [ H +  ( M − H ) ( 1 − α ) ( 1 + ε ) ] .
The left side of equation (4) is the change 
in labor earnings occasioned by a change in 
the estate tax rate. The first term in brackets on 
the right side reflects substitution and is clearly 
negative. The second term in brackets on the 
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right side of (4) is the income effect, and is 
therefore a function of the difference between 
the Hicksian and Marshallian labor supply 
elasticities. Clearly, if (1 − α)(1 + ε) = 1 
then equation (4) implies that w  dL _ dt =  
−BM _ ( 1 − t )   , 
and greater estate taxes discourage labor sup-
ply if the Marshallian labor supply schedule is 
upward-sloping. More generally, however, one 
should expect (1 − α) ( 1 + ε ) to exceed unity, 
reflecting the negative impact of estate taxes on 
receipts of after-tax bequests.
A higher value of α corresponds to a greater 
estate tax exemption relative to equilibrium 
bequests, which dampens the income effect of 
estate taxation while leaving its substitution 
effect unchanged. The value of α depends in 
part on legislative choice of how large to make 
the estate tax exemption, and this has changed 
considerably over the years. The IRS Statistics 
of Income (http://www.irs.gov/uac/Tax-Stats-2) 
reports that, among estate tax returns filed in 
2009, the available unified credit reduced the 
$33.8 billion tentative estate tax liability of tax-
able returns by $11.8 billion, or 35 percent of its 
value. In the model this corresponds to a value 
of α = 0.35.
How large is ε? As noted earlier, if pretax 
bequests do not respond to estate taxation, then 
ε = 1; whereas if pretax bequests decline at 
higher tax rates, then ε > 1. Very little is known 
about the effect of estate taxes on pretax bequests 
(Kopczuk forthcoming surveys the limited avail-
able literature), so the range of plausible poten-
tial values of  ( 1 − α ) ( 1 + ε ) is perhaps rather 
wide, though a high value in that range might be 
two. If  ( 1 − α ) ( 1 + ε ) = 2, then equation (4) 
becomes
(5)  w  dL _
dt
  =  B _ 
 ( 1 − t ) 
  ( H − 2M ) .
If the Marshallian labor supply elasticity is 
negative, then the right side of equation (5) is pos-
itive, and higher estate taxes encourage greater 
labor supply. More commonly, the Marshallian 
labor supply elasticity is estimated to be positive, 
in which case the sign of the effect of estate taxa-
tion on labor supply then depends on the rela-
tive magnitudes of the Hicksian and Marshallian 
elasticities. Specifically, the sign depends on 
whether or not the Hicksian  elasticity has double 
the magnitude of the Marshallian elasticity.
Keane (2011) offers a very useful critical sur-
vey of estimated labor supply elasticities. The 
studies reporting these estimates analyze data that 
cover different populations and time periods, and 
the resulting estimates differ as well due to meth-
odological differences. Given the varying data 
populations and degrees of persuasiveness of the 
methods used, it is altogether too crude simply to 
aggregate these estimates. It is nonetheless inter-
esting to note that, among the 21 surveyed studies 
of male labor supply for which Marshallian and 
Hicksian elasticity estimates are available, seven 
report negative Marshallian elasticities, corre-
sponding to backward-bending labor supply func-
tions. Among the remaining 14 studies, half report 
Hicksian elasticities that are more than double the 
magnitude of Marshallian elasticities, and half 
report Hicksian elasticities that are less than dou-
ble the corresponding Marshallian elasticity. The 
Keane (2011) paper also surveys estimated female 
labor supply elasticities, though only two studies 
report both Hicksian and Marshallian elasticities; 
in one case, the estimated Marshallian elasticity is 
negative, whereas in the other (Blundell, Duncan, 
and Meghir 1998) the Marshallian elasticity is pos-
itive and only slightly smaller than the Hicksian.
What conclusion is appropriate to draw from 
this evidence? It would be fair to say that it is 
difficult to know either the sign or the magnitude 
of the effect of estate taxation on labor supply. 
One difficulty is that Marshallian and Hicksian 
labor supply elasticities estimated on large pop-
ulations may not characterize the behavior of the 
part of the population that is affected by estate 
taxation. Even putting that consideration aside, 
and taking affluent families to exhibit labor mar-
ket behavior that is similar to that of the popula-
tion as a whole, the range of available estimates 
is too wide to afford much comfort in trying to 
summarize their implications for the magnitudes 
implied by equation (5). It is interesting to note 
the frequency with which available estimates 
imply that labor supply either rises or falls with 
higher estate tax rates, but even the substantial 
uncertainty over the sign of the response does 
not guarantee that its magnitude is small.
III. Conclusion
The estate tax discourages labor supply by 
reducing the return to work, but encourages 
labor supply by imposing burdens on  individuals 
both as recipients of after-tax bequests and as 
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those who plan to leave bequests. If labor sup-
ply responds to income changes, then this dou-
ble burden of estate taxation has the potential 
to encourage labor supply more than the tax-
induced relative price change discourages labor 
supply. Resolving the implication of the substi-
tution and (double) income effects of the estate 
tax is an empirical matter, for which there is no 
consensus on the magnitudes of these effects for 
the population affected by the estate tax, or for 
that matter the population as a whole.
The double burden of the estate tax is char-
acteristic of taxes on gratuitous transfers, and 
is the basis of Kaplow’s (1995) conclusion that 
efficiency requires that gifts and estates be sub-
sidized. These efficient subsidies need not be 
uniform; Farhi and Werning (2010) analyze the 
properties of welfare-maximizing income and 
estate taxes, concluding that the efficient estate 
tax subsidy rate declines with income. While 
the notion of subsidizing estates and other gra-
tuitous transfers is inconsistent with observed tax 
policies and indeed runs contrary to the common 
practice of taxing gifts and estates, it is a natural 
implication of models in which those who make 
transfers fail to internalize all of the benefits of 
their gifts, and therefore in the absence of subsi-
dies give inefficiently too little.
From the standpoint of a government with 
multiple tax instruments at its disposal, any effect 
of estate taxes on aggregate labor supply can in 
principle be reversed by adept use of other tax 
instruments. Estate taxes that are components of 
efficient tax profiles combining income and estate 
taxes may, depending on the structure of prefer-
ences and the available tax instruments, depend 
little or not at all on their effects on labor supply. 
It is nevertheless valuable to understand the likely 
implications of actual estate taxes for labor sup-
ply and other economic variables, and in particu-
lar to consider the ways in which double burdens 
of these taxes may influence economic outcomes.
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